Governance, Corruption, and Ethics in the Pacific by Huffer, Elise
The governance agenda came to the Pacific in the 1990s as a “polite”
way of dealing with corruption. It originated from the World Bank’s
assessment that a failing and inadequate political environment was the
underlying cause for sub-Saharan Africa’s unsuccessful response to struc-
tural adjustment reform. In the Pacific, the governance agenda has been
taken up by the region’s main bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as
by international agencies. They have been concerned about the region’s
lack of sustained economic development (particularly, its lack of consistent
growth); its rising political instability; the increasingly visible mismanage-
ment of public funds in many countries; and an upsurge in the so-called
ideology of traditionalism. The recipe put forward to cure these ills, in the
Pacific as in Africa, has been to promote liberal democracy, the rule of
law, government workforce reduction (“right-sizing”), and more open
markets. 
The donors and international agencies are not mistaken about the dete-
riorating political and economic conditions in the region, and they cer-
tainly have a role to play in (if not a debt toward) assisting Pacific Island
countries to enhance governance and socioeconomic development. How-
ever, real transparency on the part of the agencies would require them to
assess and publicize their motivations in promoting the governance
agenda. A more explicit explanation of why greater democratization and
economic liberalization in the Pacific suit their interests and an honest
assessment of how they may benefit Pacific Island states would be a start.
A second step would be to work in tandem with Pacific Island communi-
ties to build a more prosperous and harmonious future. This would
require listening to alternative views and becoming serious about dealing
with the social consequences of economic and financial change. Since it is
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unlikely the agencies will take the lead on this, it falls to regional acade-
mics to deconstruct the agenda, and to help explore alternative ways of
achieving better governance.
Many aspects of the governance agenda in the Pacific have already been
critiqued,1 but little has been said about the agenda’s silence on the causes
and manifestations of corruption in the Pacific, and its inability to reach
beyond standardized corrective measures to governance problems. The
lack of attention to the causes of corruption is a major flaw in the agenda,
which was designed to fix corruption in the first place. How can it aspire
to “fix” a problem if it doesn’t know what the root causes of the problem
are? Little in-depth analysis on corruption in the region has emerged;
instead, the tendency is to assume that the basis for corruption lies in cul-
ture or tradition. Fingers are generally pointed at tribal, clanic, and fam-
ily ties; the lack of a national identity and of a developed and effective con-
tractual civil society; and “bloated” civil services that lack a public service
ethic. Ultimately, “Africanisation,” or the development of a “culture of
political corruption” (LeVine 1993, 274, quoted in Szeftel 1998, 223), is
seen as the destiny of the Pacific.2
The second major flaw in the governance agenda is its almost exclusive
reliance on western thought and the accompanying policy of political and
economic liberalism. Proponents of the agenda fail to sufficiently ques-
tion how liberal democracies actually function today. This is particularly
so with respect to the subservience of present-day democracies to market
forces, which has led to widening social inequalities, a general deficit of
political participation, and an increasing role of wealth in determining
electoral outcomes. Some debate takes place in liberal democracies
regarding how to address this situation (although in the United States, for
instance, this is not a mainstream debate). But so far, the governance
agenda has done little to provoke substantive thought about what politi-
cal values and systems would best serve contemporary Pacific societies.
At best it has reluctantly accommodated “native” institutions, some of
which may be more reflective of the colonial heritage and the interests of
entrenched elites than of contemporary indigenous or native values.
Because these indigenous institutions are too powerful and useful to be
done away with and often serve to stabilize the polity, supporting them is
in the interest of the donors and (at least in the short term) of society at
large. Yet the agenda’s reliance on legislative, bureaucratic, and economic
reform is unlikely to succeed in dealing with the region’s real ills: a lack
of political participation, especially at the national level; growing socio-
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economic disparities; and a sense of cultural vulnerability to globalization
and other influences. All of these foster a climate in which malgovernance
thrives.
Dealing with these inadequacies requires a two-pronged approach: first,
to suggest approaches to evaluate corruption in the region; and second, to
make a case for the promotion of Pacific political ethics as a way of deal-
ing with corruption and wider malgovernance. Before attempting to do
this, a few words are in order about why the area of Pacific political val-
ues has not yet been a major focus of research. Most political scientists
in the Pacific have been nonnative. Our limited understanding of Pacific
cultures and languages has kept us from even beginning to understand
indigenous political conceptualization. It has always been easier to look
at institutions, events, happenings, systems, and so on. One disincentive
(applicable to native and nonnative scholars alike) has been the complex-
ity and sensitivity of the subject matter itself. In addition, native scholars
who could have done this kind of work have shied away from it for var-
ious reasons, including pressure from nonnative professors to focus on
problems and issues from a western perspective. Until recently Pacific
scholars may also have felt that there was little value or reward in study-
ing their own cultures in the area of political theory. The study of non-
western societies has traditionally been considered to belong to the realm
of anthropology rather than political science. Political theory offerings
have generally focused on western theory, from that of the early Greeks to
philosopher John Rawls and his contemporaries.3 Little encouragement
has been given to students of other cultures to explore their societies’ con-
tributions to philosophical thought. A glaring example of this was the
University of the South Pacific (usp)—the leading tertiary institution for
Pacific Islands students who subsequently work in their home islands—
which did not offer a single course in Pacific Islands philosophy or ethics
until 2004.4
Assessing Corruption in the Pacific
To date, therefore, relatively little in-depth scholarly writing on corrup-
tion in the Pacific is available. Only two authors, Peter Larmour and Ron
Crocombe, have written overviews of corruption in the region. In articles
focused on governance or politics, many scholars have touched on cor-
ruption without making it their main focus.5 In addition, a few book-
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length case studies have been published—in particular, the assessment of
the collapse of the National Bank of Fiji by Roman Grynberg, Doug
Munro, and Michael White (2002), and Kalafi Moala’s indictment of Ton-
gan politics (2002)—both of which recount instances of corruption and
mismanagement.6 However, most of these works are essentially descrip-
tive rather than analytical and therefore teach us little about corruption
beyond the different forms it takes in various parts of the region. Another
(equally descriptive) source of information providing examples of cor-
ruption can be found in the numerous official reports issued by ombuds-
persons and auditors-general (among others) in many countries of the
region.7
Without going into a detailed critique of the above works, it seems use-
ful to very briefly discuss the approaches of the two authors who have
endeavored to assess corruption regionally. Larmour’s 1997 discussion
paper, “Corruption and Governance in the South Pacific,” looks at how
corruption articulates with other aspects of governance in the region.
Unsurprisingly, the paper begins with the topic of tradition, and moves
on to “kinship, nationalism, and identity,” but also looks at the roles of
privatization and aid, and the issue of sovereignty, among other things.
Although this study shows that corruption can be explained in part by any
one of these factors, it does not appear to favor one explanation over the
others and does not suggest new avenues for more thorough analysis of
corruption in the region. 
A full chapter of Crocombe’s impressive latest edition of The South
Pacific is devoted to corruption (2001, 512–541). The chapter is a dis-
heartening if not frightening (and altogether too real) litany of corrupt acts
carried out by politicians, civil servants, and members of the private sec-
tor in most countries of the region, and of the settings in which corruption
takes place (the logging industry; customs, immigration and police depart-
ments; political parties; government cabinets; etc). It also provides a list of
reasons why such behavior takes place and why it is rarely sanctioned:
(1) a lack of “ethics of those with responsibility” 
(2) an unwillingness to “denounce or prosecute those who are cor-
rupt, for exposing others is seen as mean in close-knit societies” 
(3) a lack of truly “independent checking mechanisms” 
(4) the “grey area” between custom and corruption 
(5) abuse of affirmative action policies
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(6) the prevalence of slush funds and of nepotism 
(7) secrecy surrounding campaign financing 
(8) bribing of voters (Crocombe 2001, 514–530)
Notably, Crocombe concluded this chapter by stating, “A basic prob-
lem is to adapt ethical systems designed for small kin-based groups, to
function effectively in increasingly impersonal, mobile societies” (2001,
540). He identified the smallness of the societies and their cultural heritage
as contributing causes for corruption in many cases. But one could state
that the corrupt actions described are not so different from those carried
out in many other parts of the world, including industrialized nations,
though they may differ in degree, prevalence, and lack of sanctions. Cro-
combe also commented, “The status of politicians has probably declined
around the world, but perhaps more in the Pacific Islands than in most
places, owing to the surge of corruption and poor management” (2001,
528). This may be accurate but difficult to prove. For instance, the rates
of participation in elections are generally higher in the Pacific than in the
United States and in various European countries where participation is not
compulsory. But if for the sake of argument we were to accept Crocombe’s
comment as accurate, we could possibly attribute Pacific people’s disen-
chantment with politicians to the following: (1) they are closely tied to
those engaging in corruption (though this could both be to people’s advan-
tage or disadvantage, depending on whether or not they benefit from cor-
rupt acts); (2) they, more than residents in larger, metropolitan countries,
are directly affected by corruption, because funds are limited and access to
cash is restricted; and (3) they often feel helpless, because of confusion or
lack of information available to them about ethical standards, and because
of the lack of sanctions taken against corruption. 
In addition, Crocombe’s concluding comment could be turned around
to say that because corruption is rife in the United States as well as in the
Pacific Islands (although forms of corruption differ), ethical standards
designed for industrial democracies must be substantially improved,
strengthened, or better adapted to smaller societies that depend partly or
mainly on subsistence. At the same time, ethical systems that are specific
to Pacific societies must be better understood and reevaluated for contem-
porary purposes. 
Because no satisfactory framework for analyzing corruption in the
Pacific context has been developed, it seems useful to turn now to the
more general literature on corruption and assess how it informs the gov-
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ernance agenda in the Pacific. Another useful exercise, urgently needed in
the region, is to find out how people of all sections of society define and
understand corruption, and how they think it can be dealt with. That will
require substantial research and is not the objective of this paper; instead,
I focus on the different schools of thought about corruption and discuss
how the lenses through which the issue is viewed influence assumptions
about corruption as well as the governance agenda itself.
Trends in Thinking about Corruption
In his 1999 article “New Concepts for Old?” Robert Williams illustrated
how corruption has been defined, successively, in moral, legal, public-
office or public-interest, and finally, economic terms. The moral explana-
tion, he stated, has been “largely eschewed” by “modern social science”
and thus has generally been ignored in contemporary writing on corrup-
tion (Williams 1999, 504). In part, it has been ruled out of the equation
because of the religious connotations attached to the idea of morality.
Also, there was a time when corruption wasn’t seen as entirely negative:
apologists for corruption saw it as a way to “cut red tape” or undercut
oppressive states, or even as a necessary, unavoidable step on the road to
modernization.8 Such a view undercut the moralist position on the issue.9
The legal explanation has sought to define corruption as something that
occurs outside of rules and laws. But because laws differ from country to
country and do not necessarily or adequately represent society as a whole
(but rather, mainly, the “politically powerful” [Williams 1999, 505]),10
the legal definition has had limited scope. In many developing countries,
laws regulating public life may not even exist or may be so outdated to
be of limited value. One example is the charities law under which non-
governmental organizations operate in Fiji, and which the Qarase govern-
ment has used as a way to undermine the Citizens Constitutional Forum,
reinforce the government’s position, and constrain legitimate demands for
greater transparency. As Crocombe aptly put it: “Legally, corruption is
what the law of each nation says it is, but much ethically corrupt action
is taken within the law. In fact some of the worst is by those who claim
to be ‘fully professional’ and who by legal manipulations, keep out of jail
while enriching themselves at the expense of others” (2001, 512).
The public-office definition (which, according to Williams, was preva-
lent in the literature on corruption from the 1960s to the 1980s) employs
the distinction between the public and private realms (a strong feature in
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the development of modern western polities), to show that corruption is
behavior that deviates from a public servant’s formal duties in the inter-
est of monetary or status gains for an individual, close family, or inner cir-
cle (Nye 1967, 419, cited in Williams 1999, 505). Williams acknowledged
that this definition is appealing because it “speaks directly to official con-
duct and the centrality of duty; it seems to embrace bribery, nepotism and
embezzlement . . . and, unlike a narrowly legal approach, it appears to
offer the possibility of meaningful comparative analysis” (1999, 505).
However, as Williams further noted, the difficulty with this definition is
that it assumes that the public interest, and public and private roles, are
clearly established and distinguishable. In reality the opposite is often true:
public interest may be determined or manipulated by the politically pow-
erful, and in many societies it is not easy to determine where private and
public roles begin and end. These distinctions are sometimes hard to make
in the Pacific. For instance, it has been demonstrated that in Sämoa the
idea of a private sphere (particularly in politics) is not well developed
(Huffer and So‘o 2000; 2003).11 In addition, public opinion, which plays
a role in defining corruption, is not always monolithic (Williams 1999,
506–507), well informed, or well organized.12 In the Pacific, lack of access
to reliable information (particularly analytical and investigative journal-
ism) is a real constraint.
Corruption as seen through an economic prism gained considerable
prominence in the 1990s. It is this view that international financial insti-
tutions, the US government, and other donors subscribe to. This perspec-
tive was developed in part in response to the “corruption eruption” in the
developed countries (Williams 1999, 506),13 coinciding with a period of
increasing promotion of economic liberalism throughout the world. In
simple terms, this definition portrays the government as operating like a
private business monopoly (Williams 1999, 507), and corruption as essen-
tially rent-seeking behavior.14 Rent-seeking is pursuing “returns in excess
of a resource owner’s opportunity costs” (Williams 1999, 507), in other
words, taking advantage of a situation to maximize short-term profits to
the detriment of other economic actors. It occurs because governments
have, according to the theory, excessive control over resources and mar-
kets. As Williams pointed out, underlying this perspective is the assump-
tion that individuals are “driven by self-interest,” which they seek to max-
imize (1999, 507). This view also relies on the “constraint conception” of
human nature, which emphasizes human limitations and foibles (Antony
2003). This particular assumption about human behavior shapes much of
dialogue • huffer 125
liberal thought and has in large part led to the western or modern empha-
sis on negative rights (eg, freedom from abuse or coercion and the right
to private property),15 on the separation of powers, and on frameworks
for monitoring and controlling the roles and actions of officials. This neg-
ative view of human nature is also central to the governance agenda. But
is it a notion held by Pacific Islands peoples and societies? In the section
on Pacific political ethics I return to the question of applying such uni-
versal assumptions to particular areas.
In his critique of the governance and anti-corruption agenda in Africa,
Morris Szeftel has argued that the agenda followed almost naturally from
the international banks’ policies of structural adjustment and reform.16
Based on the latter, international financial institutions viewed the state as
the problem, that is, they considered state regulations to be largely respon-
sible for Africa’s economic woes. From there it was only a short step to
equate state regulations with rent seeking (whether legal or illegal) and
with corruption. The international financial institutions therefore began
advocating for the “unrestrained” power of the state to be curtailed both
economically and politically. These institutions and other international
agencies have come to the conclusion that economic growth requires
democratization and liberalization (although this conclusion is based on
a model of cause and effect that is more a matter of faith than of hard
data).17 In other words, they assume that “the liberal economy needs a
liberal state” and that, hand in hand, these two forces will address the
problem of corruption (Szeftel 1998, 226). 
Paradoxically, behind such conceptions on the part of donor states and
international institutions lies the following uncomfortable thought: if
political and economic liberalization fail to deal with corruption, corrup-
tion will further undermine liberal democratization and lead to continued
erosion of public trust. The economistic view of corruption has come
about not so much as a result of a better understanding of the needs and
specific circumstances of developing countries, but more out of the West’s
concern to promote and protect its way of life. It needs the rest of the
world to accept free market access and to react in predictable ways. It also
needs a constant strengthening of democratization worldwide to ensure
and enhance representative democracy at home and to be able to counter
various extremist political voices around the world. 
When assessing and dealing with corruption in the Pacific, we need to
be cognizant of how these different schools of thought have evolved and
what worldviews frame them.18 We should also remember that many (if
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not all) of the organizations issuing corruption indices (used by the World
Bank to justify and determine policy) rely on surveys or opinions of firms
conducting business in those countries. They rarely, if ever, draw on in-
country research conducted with local communities.
Further, the economistic view of corruption and governance does not
sufficiently acknowledge the danger that privatization and deregulation
may increase corruption rather than decrease it. For instance, in Sämoa,
moves have been made toward greater corporatization of services—a sort
of intermediary step between state and private ownership. These corpo-
rations, essentially public firms run as private businesses, are, according
to their bylaws, not accountable to Parliament; their accounts are viewed
only by their board and by cabinet. As Crocombe noted, “The problem
with politicians managing public assets is that they want benefits before
the next election, whereas the public interest requires managers with a
long time horizon and concern for public interest. The problem is not,
however, necessarily solved by transferring ownership to businessmen.
. . . The worst combination, which is promoted by the international banks
and already adopted in a number of [Pacific] countries, is to retain gov-
ernment-ownership but let private businessmen manage such corpora-
tions. They can then use a public asset for their private benefit, and often
do, to public detriment” (2001, 548).
Another problem in the fight against corruption is the creation of non-
governmental organizations, which tend to constitute an artificial, urban-
based, contractual “civil society,” disconnected from peri-urban and rural
communities, if not from society at large.19 This is not to say that many
such organizations aren’t useful, but they risk becoming a distraction when
they monopolize the debate with government and may also hamper other,
more representative voices from being heard. Governments may consider
consultation with nongovernmental organizations sufficient and there-
fore neglect sustained interaction with communities and the citizenry. In
addition, many nongovernmental organizations are closely tied to inter-
national organizations and donors.20 This potentially alienates them from
local communities, which hold their own worldviews, and provides easy
ammunition to conservative governments that consider them foreign
impositions. 
Implicit in views of corruption that emphasize rent seeking or public
versus private interests and roles lie the assumptions that developing coun-
tries are not fully equipped to deal with corruption and that their cultures
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are at fault. As Szeftel wrote, “It is a premise that chimes with anti-
corruption measures adopted by the governance agenda, an assumption
that values of honesty and transparency must be ‘taught’ through the pres-
sures imposed by globalization and by persuasion, conferences, educa-
tional materials and, if necessary, sanctions and public condemnation.
This kind of view is found in much western writing about corruption in
non-western societies. The literature on corruption in Asia, for instance,
devotes much space to traditions of gift-giving, family solidarity and def-
erence against which ‘foreign’ notions of honesty must contend” (1998,
236). This is also how corruption is often approached in the Pacific. What
is less discussed is the lack of adaptability on the part of institutions, both
those of representative democracy and those remaining as a legacy of colo-
nialism. For instance, in the governance agenda, there is little talk of the
decline of parliaments in the running of public affairs in western democ-
racies, and the consequent lack of public participation in the running of
government (Fleming and Holland 2001). Instead, Pacific parliamentari-
ans just receive training on how to better carry out their jobs, and parlia-
mentary libraries are given technical assistance and money to buy books.
This is akin to applying a Band-Aid to a bleeding six-inch gash. 
Because all of the above explanations have their own historical concep-
tual baggage and do not provide satisfactory answers about how corrup-
tion should be analyzed, we must seek answers elsewhere. Perhaps we
should begin by asking ourselves questions about the nature of corruption
in the Pacific. One such question, reflected in the title of a book chapter by
Oskar Kurer (2001), could be, “Why Do Voters Support Corrupt Politi-
cians?” In his attempt to respond to this question, Kurer examined a range
of explanations (including the cultural one), which he then dismissed, set-
tling for what he called reasons of demand and supply. On the demand
side, he pinpointed three areas: voter ignorance, inconsistent preferences,
and the collective-action dilemma. Ignorance includes people’s inability
to imagine an alternative system, lack of knowledge of the extent and the
detrimental effects of corruption, or difficulties in discerning the corrupt
or noncorrupt intentions of those standing for election. Inconsistent pref-
erences refers to the fact that although voters view corruption as “mate-
rially disadvantageous and morally repugnant, and express their feelings
in anticorruption statements—at the same time they believe it is advan-
tageous and morally justified to avail themselves of the opportunity it
opens” (2000, 79). The collective-action dilemma states that people
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choose politicians because, although they may dislike them, they feel that
not choosing them may be too risky, if the majority of voters choose those
politicians anyway.21 Kurer’s supply-side explanation focuses on barriers
to entering politics, including high opportunity costs, faced by officials
who are not corrupt (2001, 77–82). Whether or not we accept Kurer’s
model, one important area he has suggested for further research is how
people perceive corruption compared with how institutions actually func-
tion: “Empirical evidence that compares subjective voters’ assessments
and objective criteria is . . . entirely missing” (Kurer 2001, 77). This
would be a useful direction for research on corruption in the Pacific.
Also relevant to the situation in the Pacific is this commentary by Kurer:
“The question of why voters support corrupt politicians has not been a
popular one. One reason for its unpopularity could be the uncomfortable
implications that emerge for the ‘good governance’ debate. It jeopardizes
the comfortable assumption that corruption is unrelated to the electoral
process and implies that in many cases administrative reforms, and even
the reduction of entry barriers, are unlikely to yield the results promised
by their designers. Fighting corruption becomes the eminently political
task of transforming political culture in the widest sense” (2001, 83).
Assuming people want to transform or enhance political culture in the
Pacific,22 we must first reach a better understanding of Pacific political
thought and ethics. Although there may be sufficient parallels to say some-
thing about the region as a whole (see Huffer and Qalo 2004), political
thought and ethics will vary from community to community, from coun-
try to country. It is a good idea, therefore, to start exploring a community
or a country at a time. We should ask such questions as: What do people
expect from their institutions, leaders, and systems? What do they hold
to be politically “good”? What is corruption, in their view? Did corrup-
tion occur in the traditional context? How was it dealt with? We should
not try to answer these questions without participation of people from all
sectors of society. This should not be an empty exercise in which the
answers become the property of researchers and have no impact on soci-
ety; rather, communities should fully participate in the process of deter-
mining what is important and politically valuable to them, and research-
ers should be responsible for articulating and publicizing the results in
close collaboration with the communities.
This brings us to the area of ethics, which must be developed more fully
before understanding why it may be useful in the process of political trans-
formation.
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Pacific Political Ethics
Calum R Paton, in his 1992 book Ethics and Politics, Theory and Practice,
said that the first question of ethics is, “What does good or right mean?”
and the second question is, “What sort of things are good and right?” He
explained that the first question is “answered universally”—all societies
are concerned with good or right—and that the focus of the second ques-
tion, “the content of good and right,” varies “over time or across soci-
eties” in how it is interpreted and acted out (1992, 60).23 The main
dilemma for ethics and moral philosophy, then, is to reconcile universalist
or “absolutist” views with relativist, particularist, pluralist perspectives.
In simple terms, the absolutists ask, if there are no standards by which all
humankind can be judged, of what use are standards? If we cannot say,
for instance, that all human beings deserve basic human rights, how can
the idea of human rights be useful? The relativists say that all cultures vary
and no one should decide for others what is right or good for them.24
Common sense generally dictates that a satisfying answer lies somewhere
in between, and many moral philosophers have argued for that position.
But it still poses a dilemma for moral philosophy, particularly since, as Jim
Tiles put it, “The central question to be addressed in the systematic study
of ethics is, ‘what basis, if any, do people have for approving or con-
demning the practices of other people?’” (2000, 1).
Why is this debate relevant to the Pacific? Simply because the gover-
nance agenda and the economistic discourse on corruption are under-
pinned by the notion that there are universal values that apply to all soci-
eties. The ethical stance taken by donors is steeped in western philosophy,
considered universal and therefore applicable to all equally. The problem
with this, as Samuel Fleischacker pointed out in The Ethics of Culture
(1994), is that from the Enlightenment onward the western tradition has
refused to acknowledge its basis in a particular “story,” that is, a partic-
ular history, tradition, and culture.25 “The West may constitute a distinc-
tive culture, but its unwillingness to admit that it is a distinctive culture
has deprived it of much of the ethical power that other cultures have in
their societies” (Fleischacker 1994, 215; emphasis in original). In other
words, by assuming that it is not on the same footing as other cultural tra-
ditions and that it has in fact dismissed tradition or risen above it, west-
ern thinking has become domineering, even though it may be well-mean-
ing in many ways. This also applies to the governance agenda and the
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battle against corruption waged by the international banks and donors.
An example is the emphasis placed on the deliberate construction of a civil
society that is unrelated to and often outside Pacific cultural norms.
Another difficulty with the absolutist tendencies that underpin the gov-
ernance agenda is the unwillingness to accept alternative political thought
or ethics that are grounded in local culture. Following on from the colo-
nial legacy, donors (in particular the metropolitan powers) and interna-
tional institutions have been reluctant to provide room for the expression
of political thinking that may represent neither their own views nor those
of native but colonially derived institutions (such as the Council of Chiefs
in Fiji). This has led to a lack of political debate and to a manipulation
of core values by entrenched elites with whom accommodation has been
sought (to varying extents in different countries) from colonial times until
today. Metropolitan countries and international institutions have favored
an attitude of what Fleischacker terms “charity” rather than “respect”
with Pacific Islands countries: “When we seek the well-being of all indi-
viduals, the good as we construe it, then we are pursuing charity. . . . When
we seek the freedom of all individuals, distancing ourselves from them
enough to let them define what they construe as good . . . then we are pur-
suing respect” (1994, 178). It is this notion of charity that permeates the
view that corruption is culture-related and that Pacific Islanders must be
taught to establish standards set by the rule of law and by codes of con-
duct designed beyond their shores. If we were to compare the corruption
of two police forces, for instance, one in New York and one in Fiji, it
would never occur to anyone to say that a New York policeman should
forget his cultural affiliations or background, but it wouldn’t be surpris-
ing to hear that said of the Fijian policeman.26 No one has suggested that
Americans change their cultural traditions in light of the Enron case, but
we frequently hear that Fijians, Tongans, or ni-Vanuatu must change their
culture and attitudes before they have any chance of dealing with cor-
ruption. These kinds of double standards are implicit in the governance
agenda’s attitudes to politics and to corruption in the Pacific (and else-
where).
Does this mean that Pacific Islanders must prove that they have their
own brand of political ethics? No, but it shows that if Pacific communi-
ties want to be able to set their own political agenda, they (and we as
responsible academics) should engage in a debate about the political con-
cepts and values they hold. This debate should also quickly become cross-
cultural so that Pacific communities are able to articulate their agenda to
the international community. 
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It is also obvious that corruption cannot be dealt with by imposing rules
that people don’t feel are relevant or significant. As argued by Kate Gilles-
pie and Gwenn Okruhlik: “Scholars agree that no cleanup measure can
be effective unless it is supported by the ethical norms of society. . . . Cor-
ruption thrives in an environment where there is no consensus on what it
is. An important corrective, then, is a common standard of morality”
(1991, 80). In order to identify a common standard of morality in the
Pacific (or in the respective countries of the Pacific), we need to start look-
ing at what people hold to be important. 
Ethics should be seen as an “action-guiding code” (Fleischacker 1994,
15), constituted by peoples’ values, which are in turn nourished by their
histories, traditions, and the changes they have experienced. But before
designing this code, communities must have the opportunity to examine,
evaluate, and express their values. This can be accomplished at different
levels.
Much more research is required on Pacific political thought, through
both reviewing existing literature and working with people throughout the
region. In a paper entitled “Have We Been Thinking Upside Down? The
Contemporary Emergence of Pacific Theoretical Thought” (2004), Ropate
Qalo and I examined work carried out by Pacific scholars including the-
ologians, educators, native and indigenous sociologists and anthropolo-
gists (often employing interdisciplinary approaches), and by local commu-
nities seeking to assert Pacific, national, or local worldviews in churches,
schools, government, and other venues. Additional sources not mentioned
in that paper that provide an important commentary on Pacific values are
contemporary literature, art, and film. Although none of these areas are
directly political, it is possible to derive political principles from them.
Because in the Pacific there is a tradition of “discretion” regarding polit-
ical matters, it is not always easy to engage in a debate about political val-
ues. It is therefore important to find ways of working with communities
that are comfortable for participants and where the benefits are mutual.
A good example of this is David Welchman Gegeo and Karen Ann Wat-
son-Gegeo’s documenting of the Kwara‘ae Genealogy Project; another is
Qalo’s documentation of his family’s business, the Mucunabitu Iron
Works (see Huffer and Qalo 2004). In both these cases close links (includ-
ing kinship) bind the scholar and the community. More such collabora-
tive ventures are needed. While they may not tell us directly about polit-
ical views or how people feel about national government, they can inform
us about ethical attitudes toward what the international community calls
development. They can also help define ethical standards, based on ideas
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of what the “good life” is, how it is attained, and how it may be destroyed;
how people should conduct themselves in business; how wealth should be
distributed; how family (in the extended sense) should be included in the
running of business; and so on. Collaborative research projects such as
these can be valuable exercises in both philosophical and practical terms,
and should be recognized and encouraged. If international banks and
donors are really interested in seeking out people’s views of development
and their ethical standards, they should look first toward this type of
research and community efforts. Poverty and corruption are less likely to
occur in communities that engage in self-reflection and self-help than in
those where values have been destroyed or distorted by what are often
paternalistic and standardized policies (and by those with leaders who
have been co-opted by the lure of money).27
Another example of a self-reliant approach (also mentioned in Huffer
and Qalo 2004) is the TuVanuatu Kominiti, which Hilda Lini has been
closely involved with and has briefly documented. This community initia-
tive created its own bank and educational institute, both focused on local
needs. No doubt many people in positions of influence, be they Pacific
Islanders or outsiders, consider such initiatives to be unrealistic or imprac-
tical. But they provide people with faith in themselves and their ways,
and, more importantly, they create functional groups of people who are
productive. Their example should be publicized, better understood, and
mirrored.
Faculty from the University of the South Pacific have also conducted
useful initiatives with local communities in the management of marine
and other resources. In defining how they wish to manage their resources,
the communities are also making ethical statements and decisions about
development. One possible avenue for pursuing the publicizing of more
explicitly political ethical statements is to engage communities in action
research about their access to basic rights and services and to political par-
ticipation. This would help build understanding about how they frame or
view political goods and initiate discussions about contemporary politi-
cal values.
It is also necessary to investigate the sources and the content of ethical
standards people put forward.28 What do people in the Pacific rely on or
look to when they make ethical judgments? We must be careful to not
adopt an idealistic or romantic view of the latter and be as critical of those
as we have been about liberal assumptions regarding other societies. As
Fleischacker wrote, “Ethical conclusions, while fixed at each moment of
action, can always be opened up again. So when we draw on our culture
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in deciding how to act, we need some clear idea of who and what is in it
and of what it has to say, but we can remain aware that the absolute truth
on these questions eludes us every time, and we can be open to including
different people or ideas in, or revising our interpretations of, our culture
whenever the heat of actions subsides to make room for new reflection”
(1994, 145–146).
As things currently stand, it is almost as though the “heat of actions”
has never subsided in the Pacific (an ironic thought in a place often por-
trayed as being slow moving) and little new reflection has been allowed
to come to light. And yet it is high time that scholars and communities
throughout the region are encouraged to stand back and engage in criti-
cal reflection on political values and ethics.
Notes
1 For a general critique of the governance agenda, see, among others, Left-
wich 1993 and Williams and Young 1994; on Africa, see Szeftel 1998; and on the
Pacific, see Goldsmith 2000; Macdonald 1995; Huffer and Molisa 1999; and
Huffer and So‘o 2000.
2 In academia, the main proponent of the “Africanisation” claim has been
Ben Reilly (2000). At least three regional scholars have disputed this claim; see
Fraenkel 2003; Teaiwa 2002; Ratuva 2003.
3 John Rawls is the author of A Theory of Justice (1971). As Will Kymlicka
stated about Rawls, “His theory dominates the field [of political theory], not in
the sense of commanding agreement, for very few people agree with all of it, but
in the sense that later theorists have defined themselves in opposition to Rawls”
(2002, 55). 
4 The University of the South Pacific has tended to view its mission as “train-
ing” students to carry out tasks instead of challenging them to think creatively
by drawing on different traditions of thought. A course on Pacific thought, phi-
losophy, and ethics is now offered in the usp graduate governance program.
5 There are too many articles on governance and politics to list here. Useful
sources are the Pacific Economic Bulletin and the discussion paper series, State,
Society and Governance in Melanesia, from the Research School of Pacific and
Asian Studies at the Australian National University. David Lea has also written
at least one short article on corruption in Papua New Guinea (1998–99).
6 Lea’s Introduction to the Ethics of Business and Development in Melanesia
also looks at instances of corruption in Papua New Guinea, but as the title sug-
gests, his essential purpose is to examine the notion of ethics in business (2001).
His approach is Eurocentric in the sense that it uses western philosophical thought
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and norms to measure or judge Melanesian (in particular Papua New Guinean)
behavior in business and development.
7 Numerous reports of corruption or alleged corruption can also be found in
newspapers and magazines covering countries of the region.
8 For more details, see Szeftel 1998, and Heidendheimer, Johnston, and
LeVine 1989.
9 The moralist position may be making a comeback in the form of the many
centers for ethics that are blossoming on campuses (and websites), particularly in
the United States, but also in Europe. A study on what has driven the creation of
these centers, and their links to transnational corporations and finance, would be
useful. One reason for the revival of ethics is suggested in chapter 3 of Jenny Flem-
ing and Ian Hollard’s edited volume, Motivating Ministers to Morality: “Why do
we feel a need to return to the older notions of ethics and virtue? Is it an honest
acknowledgement that liberal democracy, with its emphasis on choice as the high-
est good, in fact needs and presupposes such virtues? Is it the only way religion
and faith, relegated to the private sphere, can gain purchase in public deliberation
in liberal democracy? Perhaps it is the only proper answer to the decline of par-
liament thesis” (2001, 31). 
10 Williams wrote, “The legal approach . . . depends on the notion that legal
frameworks are somehow neutral, objective and non-political. . . . Laws are gen-
erally made by the politically powerful who can determine what conduct is
declared improper. Equality before the law remains at best an aspiration in many
jurisdictions. If legality is a matter for the politically powerful, using only legal
criteria to define corruption is to endorse the authority of the strong rather than
the just” (1999, 505).
11 This should not be taken to mean that a Samoan (or any other Pacific)
politician cannot distinguish what is in the public interest from what serves his
or her own particular interest.
12 Williams added: “Public awareness is often low, access to mass media is
limited and state censorship is common. The values of rural communities may be
incommensurate with those of urban elites or there may be clashes between the
opinions of different religious or ethnic groups. Where there is no clear public
perception of a set of principles governing the conduct of public office or there
is an inability to identify and specify the public interest, the contribution of pub-
lic opinion to clarifying the public office and public interest definitions is corre-
spondingly reduced” (1999, 506).
13 Since the 1990s, a spate of high-profile corruption cases erupted through-
out Europe, North America, Japan, and Korea, among others. Although corrup-
tion itself may not have increased, publicity about it has certainly grown, and
with it, the public perception that politics is a “dirty game.” So whereas prior to
the 1990s corruption was treated as essentially a problem of developing coun-
tries, it is now evident that developed countries are not immune.
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14 Demonstrating that many scholars have succumbed to an economistic
view of governance problems, Szeftel wrote, “‘Rent-seeking’ has . . . become a
euphemism for ‘corruption’ among many political scientists” (1998, 224).
15 See Habermas 1996 and 1997; Mutua 2002.
16 I am indebted to Szeftel in this section. Much of what he has written in his
article on Africa coincides with my own thoughts on the governance agenda and
its problems in the Pacific.
17 See, notably, Leftwich 1993 and 2000 for arguments disproving the notion
that democratization is a necessary precondition for development.
18 A further and more recent school of thought links corruption with crimi-
nalization. In the Pacific, Sinclair Dinnen (see in particular 2001) and Maxine
Pitts (2002) have written about the links between corruption and crime in Papua
New Guinea. This school of thought could be seen as an extension of the legal
and public-office views of corruption.
19 Szeftel is even more critical of the governance agenda for opposing the
state and civil society: “Firstly the crude antithesis of state and civil society has
no basis in reality; democracy rests on a dynamic and effective state as much as
on ‘civil society’ (Glaser 1997). Secondly, it is difficult to believe that this watch-
dog role can be performed by a donor-sponsored ‘civil society’ of civic and
human rights associations dependent on foreign funding (Allen 1997)” (Szeftel
1998, 235).
20 The ties between local and international nongovernmental organizations
and donors have been discussed by Huffer and Grace Molisa (1999) in the Vanu-
atu context, and by Peggy Fairbairn-Dunlop (2000) and Iati Iati (2000) in the
Samoan context. See Mutua 2002 on the nature and policies of international
nongovernmental organizations in the human rights arena.
21 This was the case, for instance, with the “rotten boroughs” in the United
Kingdom, and the “political machinery” operating in Chicago under Mayor Rich-
ard Daley.
22 We can probably assume that people are eager to effect change but are not
sure how to go about it. The rising violence and crumbling of institutions in
many countries is an indication that change is needed.
23 It may be a stretch to interpret ethics in this way, since the idea of univer-
sality is grounded in the approach of moral philosophy, which seeks to say some-
thing about all humankind regardless of time or place.
24 Makau Mutua has been very critical of the universalists in the context of
human rights: “Many . . . who regard themselves as universalists have labeled
many cultural pluralists ‘cultural relativists,’ a form of typecasting or human
rights name-calling that has generally had the effect of stigmatizing those who
resist the Eurocentric formulation of human rights.” He continued, pointing out
somewhat ironically, “Were this [his] book confined to this dichotomous view, it
would be fair to label the universalists cultural relativist, as well, because uni-
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versalists operate in a specific cultural space and distinct historical tradition”
(2002, 43).
25 Fleischacker wrote that “most of us are Westerners whatever else we are,
heirs to the peculiarly Western history of the Enlightenment, and some of us—a
good many—are heirs to the Enlightenment first and foremost. What this means,
in large part, is that we have tried to overcome, or at least weaken, our other cul-
tural allegiances in the light of the Enlightenment critique of tradition and author-
ity. The Enlightenment presented itself as an enemy of cultures, a destroyer of
sacred stories and their authoritative interpreters. But it also produced a culture
of its own, a distinctive Enlightenment culture, which bears much the same rela-
tion to its Christian past as Christianity does to the worlds of Greece and Judea”
(1994, 200).
26 One reason for this assumption may be that the police force as a con-
temporary institution is a western construct. Nonetheless, many police forces
throughout the United States are notably corrupt, just as they are in some coun-
tries of the Pacific. Perhaps that says something universal about the institution
itself.
27 A telling example of this is found in Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo 2002. It
illustrates how a previously successful project, built on the basis of local episte-
mology, was undermined by the intervention of a retired government official, the
former director of “a major financial institution in Honiara,” who came back to
his village to implement his “Anglo-European, modernization vision” (2002,
394). The project had been constructed and designed entirely by villagers, youth,
and elders, to enhance and build traditional knowledge and to provide activities
and occupations chosen by and carried out by the youth in collaboration with
selected village elders. The project subsequently failed, and disaffected youth left
the village for Honiara, which was exactly what the project had been designed
to prevent.
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